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CONTBACTs-FAIR TRADE LAWS-RESALE PRICE-MAINTENANCE
AGREEMENTs-Under modern resale price maintenance laws, the
producer or distributor of a brand name or trade-marked product
competing with other products of the same general class may set
a minimum price below which a retailer may not resell.' Such
legislation serves a definite economic purpose. Manufacturers
customarily attempt to develop in their consumers a brand pre-
ference for their product. This preference, if developed, is usually
the result of a costly advertising campaign as well as extensive
research and quality control.2 Once this brand preference-a form
of good-will-has been created, it is of great value to the producer.
Justice Sutherland stated in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Sea-
grami-Distilers Corp.3 that "The primary aim of the law is to pro-
tect the property-namely, good will-of the producer."
4
The producers of proprietary medicines were the first to use re-
sale price maintenance contracts to prevent retailers from using their
brand nanie products as leaders or loss leaders.5 The United States
Supreme Court in Fowle v. Park,6 the earliest case of importance,
held that the following ancillary contract supplementing a sales
agreement was not an unreasonable restraint of trade:
The vendees agreed they "will not sell, or cause any of said
medicine to be sold, at less price than seven dollars for each
and every dozen, except to such persons as shall become their
agents for a whole state or territory; and in all cases where such
agencies are granted they also promise and agree to take from
such agents an agreement, with a sufficient guaranty of penalty,
that no sales of said medicine shall be made at a less price than
that above named... "
Students of the common law today are not in agreement as to
wvhether vertical' resale price maintenance agreements were con-
1. Miller-Tydings Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946); McGuire Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1946).
2. See Oppenheim, Unfair Trade Practices, 22 (1950).
3. 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
4. 299 U.S. 183, 193 (1936) (dictum).
5. See Chain Stores Leaders and Loss Leaders, Sen. Doc. No. 51, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1932). "A loss leader is . . . an article sold below net invoice cost, net purchase
cost or net manufacturing cost as the case may be, or it may be applied to goods sold
below the net purchase cost of the goods plus operating costs, or simply to goods sold below
the usual mark-up .... Leaders . . . are merchandise featured or sold at reduced prices
to attract buyers and thereby stimulate sales of these leaders and other goods."
6. 131 U.S. 88 (1889).
7. Grether, Price Control under Fair Trade Legislation, 4 (1939). ". . .vertical price
control is defined as a price constraint between sellers on different levels, as for instance
between manufacturers and wholesalers and retailers. The most pronounced form of vertical
price control has long been known as 'resale price maintenance,' Horizontal price control
is defined as a constraint between sellers on a given level. For instance, when retailers in
a local market employ measures of price regulation by agreement among themselves,
this activity would be classified as 'horizontal'; if maufacturers put the devices into effect
for the retailers the procedure would be classified as 'vertical.' "
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sidered an unreasonable restraint of trade.- The Sherman Anti-
Trust Act,9 adopted in 1890, provided that "every contract, com-
bination. . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states is hereby declared to be illegal." Vertical price
maintenance agreements were considered legal under this Act until
1911. In that year the Supreme Court in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
Park & Sons Co.10 struck down a system of resale price maintenance
agreements as being invalid restraints of trade under the common
law. The Court also implied that the agreements were invalid under
the Sherman Act." While technically a form of vertical price main-
enance, the contracts between producer and distributors involved
in the Dr. Miles case were actually so complete as to have the effect
of horizontal resale price fixing. 2
The decision in the Dr. Miles case eliminated one of the most
effective methods the producers had of controlling the resale prices
of their'branded products. They could still attempt to control prices
by refusing to deal with dealers who would not sell at their stipul-
ated price"3 or they could distribute their products through their own
retail chain agencies. 14 These methods, however, did not give the
producer adequate protection. Although the producers could re-
fuse to make future deliveries to dealers not selling at the suggest-
ed price, this did not prevent dealers from selling their stock on
hand as loss leaders. The majority of the producers did not have the
machinery to sell through their own retail chain outlets or agencies.
The American Fair Trade League was consequently organized
in 1913 for the support of resale price maintenance legislation.
Numerous bills were thereafter presented to the Congress for the
8. See Kennedy, Stormy Weather for Trade, Vol. 27 Iowa Business Digest, 1
(Jan. 1956).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1952).
10. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). (The Dr. Milles company produced proprietary medicines
under secret formulas. Contracts were enter into with over four hundred jobbers and
wholesalers requiring them to sell only to retail or wholesale agents of said proprietor and
at not less than stipulated prices. The Dr. Miles company also entered into contracts with
twenty-five thousand retailers requiring them not to sell at less than the full retail price
printed on the packages, without reduction for quantity and not to sell the the said proprie-
tary medicines at any price to dealers not accredited agents of the Dr. Miles Medical Com-
pany. Park & Sons Company, a wholesale drug concern refused to enter into the wholesale
contract. Park & Sons. Co. procured supplies of the Dr. Miles Co. medicines and sold them
at leader prices. Dr. Miles Co. asked for an injunction alleging that the defendant was
inducing violations of the vertical resale price contracts. Relief was denied.)
11. Ibid.
12. Papandreou and Wheeler, Competition and Its Regulation, 441 (1954).
13. U.S. v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (dictum); But see U.S. v. A.
Schroeder's Sons, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920) (Could not be used to enforce an illegal
agreement to maintain a resale price); F.T.C. v. Beechnut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441
(1922) (Could not be carried to the extent of spying on distributors and threatening to
withhold supplies).
14. U.S. v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926); U.S. v. General Electric Co.,
82 F. Supp. 753 (D. N.J. 1949).
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purpose of legalizing price maintenance practices.15 However, none
of these were enacted. Congress not only refused to pass a national
resale price maintenance law but also took a step in the opposite
direction by passing the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914.10
Section 5 of this Act declared that "unfair methods of competition
are hereby declared unlawful." However, that same year the Clay-
ton Act17 was passed. This allowed a manufacturer, in the absence
of any intent to create a monopoly, to refuse to sell to wholesalers or
retailers who failed to resell at the producer's price. This was at
most a qualified victory for advocates of fair trade enactments.
Promoters of resale price maintenance on the state level did not
have major success until 1931. In that year a grocer introduced a
fair trade bill in the lower house of the California legislature. This
bill was passed with the help of strong support from the druggists.18
However, it did not provide for a non-signer clause and a number
of cut-rate druggists refused to sign price maintenance contracts
with the producers. These druggists purchased branded products
from other sources and continued to undersell dealers who had
signed fair trade agreements. In 1933 this defect in the California
statute was corrected by a change in wording which included
persons advertising, offering for sale or selling fair trade products
whether they were or were not parties to the resale price mainten-
ance contract. The producer could now, by contracting with only
one dealer, control in that jurisdiction the resale price of the
protected commodity sold by all dealers having knowledge of the
contract. This non-signer clause read as follows:
"Willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or
selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated in any
contract entered into pursuant to the provision. . . of this act,
whether the person so advertising, offering for sale or selling
is or is not a party to such contract, is unfair competition and
is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby."19
This provision, copied in Illinois, was upheld in 1936 by the
United States Supreme Court,"0 against the assertions that it
violated the due process of law clause and the equal protection of
the laws clause of the Fourteenth'Amendment to the United States
15. H.R. 13305, 63 Cong. 2 Sess. (1914) (Stevens Bill); H.R. 13860, 63 Cong. 2
Sess. (1914) (Metz Bill); Representative Clyde Kelly of Pa. introduced bills in each session
of Congress from the Sixty-fifth through the Seventy-second and each failed to pass, See
note 12 supra, at 442.
16. 15 U.S.C. 1 41-58 (1946).
17. 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
18. See 6 Syracuse L. Rev. 328 (1954-1955).
19. Cal. Ann. Code § 16904 (West 1954).
20. See Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
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Constitution..2 1 Twenty-nine states enacted fair trade laws during
the next year.
2 2
Promoters of fair trade laws on the state level now had to over-
come the federal anti-trust laws. The National Association of Retail
Druggists, the National Retail Grocers Association, and the National
Institute of Wine and Spirits Distributors actively supported the
passage of federal resale price maintenance legislation.23 In 1937
the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was
passed, amending section 2 of the Sherman Act of 1890.2 The a-
mendment legalized vertical minimum resale price maintenance
contracts regulating branded merchandise sold in interstate com-
merce. It was provided, however, that the merchandise had to be in
free and open competition with commodities of the same general
class and had to be resold in states possessing fair trade laws. Later
court interpretations of the Miller-Tydings Amendment made it evi-
dent that the law was not a blanket endorsement of fair trade resale
price maintenance.2 5 It was said that the Miller-Tydings Amend-
ment "merely permits the individual states to function without
federal restraint, within their proper sphere, and does not commit
the Congress to a national policy on the subject matter of the state
laws. In other words, the bill does no more than remove Federal
obstacles to the enforcement of contracts which the states themselves
have declared lawful."21 Following the Miller-Tydings Amendment,
however, many additional states enacted Fair Trade legislation.
27
Thereafter, however, loopholes began to develop in the coverage
of fair trade legislation. In 1951 the United States Supreme Court
held in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.2 that the
Miller-Tydings Amendment did not legalize state-enacted non-
signer provisions with respect to goods moving in inter-state
commerce. In the preceding year, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
had held in Sunbeam Corp. v. Wentling29 that the Pennsylvania fair
trade act non-signer provision covered price cutting by dealers only
21. See note 3 supra, at 191, 192; For a discussion of the constitutionality of the N.D.
statute see 26 N.D. Bar Briefs 29 (1950). For other states see Max Factor & Co. v.
Kunsman, Cal.2d 446, 55 P.2d 177 (1936); Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Owl Drug Co., 67
S.D. 523, 295 N.W. 292 (1940), Sears v. Western Thrift Stores of Olympia, Inc., 10
Wash.2d 372, 116 P.2d 756 (1941).
22. See Oppenheim, Unfair Trade Practice, 901, 902 (1950).
23. See note 12, supra at 448.
24. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (Supp. 1955).
25. See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Eastman Kodak
Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 158 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1946).
26. See Note 22, supra, at 945.
27. See note 22, supra.
28. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
29. 185 F.2d 903 (3rd Cir. 1950).
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in that state. Hence mail order houses in Pensylvania were free to
buy fair trade merchandise in one state and sell the merchandise
in another state below the fair trade price. The cumulative effect
of these decisions destroyed the non-signer clause which is the
heart of the resale price maintenance acts, and rendered the federal
and state acts of little value in controlling the price of goods moving
in interstate commerce.
As a result of the holding in the Schwegmann case, the McGuire
Act was passed in 1952.30 This act filled the non-signer loophole in
the Miller-Tydings Amendment. Since passage of the McGuire Act,
the Supreme Court has refused to review cases upholding the
constitutionality of the non-signer clause.
31
FAIR TRADE, PRO AND CON
One of the functions of the fair trade law is to prevent retailers
from using brand name products as "leader" or "loss leaders" to
attract trade as well as to prevent the present day discount houses
from selling the products at far less than conventional retail stores.
Manufacturers assert that if discount houses and large retail outlets
sell their branded products for less than the small retailer, the small
retailer will soon refuse to handle his product.3 2 Lowering the price
of a brand name product will tend to lower the value of the product
in the eyes of many consumers.3 3 It is said that manufacturers
desire retail price maintenance and if they are denied the right under
fair trade laws to maintain prices, they will attempt to control the
resale price of trade-mark products with devices such as refusal
to deal and the agency system. These methods are less desirable
in terms of preserving price competition than is the present resale
price maintenance legislation.23
Advocates of fair trade laws also claim that the use of leaders and
loss leaders harm the consumer. Thus, when a consumer shops at
a store to buy a leader, he may be induced to believe that he is
saving on other items as well.35 Studies assertedly have shown that
price-wise the consumers benefit from fair trade laws.3"
30. 15"U.S.C. 1 45 (1946).
31. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Eli Lilly Co. 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.
1953), cert. denied 346 U.S. 856 (1953).
. 32. See War on the Discount House, Business Week, Sept. 11, 1954, p. 170; Discounter
Embarrasses GE, Business Week, Nov. 6, 1945, p. 54.
33. See Ingersoll v. Hahne & Co., 88 N.J. Eq. 222, 101 Atl. 1030 (1917).
34. See 64 Yale L. J. 967 (1955).
35. Wilcox, Public Policies Toward Business, 419 (1955).
36. Ostund and Vickland, Fair Trade and the Retail Drug Store, 115 (1940) ("Prices of
leading proprietary items sold in North and South Dakota drug stores have declined 5.17
per cent, on the average, since the enactment in 1937 of the Fair Trade Acts which per-
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Smaller retailers claim that without price protection they cannot
compete with the large chain stores. In order to stay in business they
must meet the lower prices set by the larger retail outlets. Price
protection is necessary to keep small businesses operating.
Opponents of the fair trade laws assert that many manufacturers
do not wish to control the resale price of their products but do so
mainly at the urging of their dealers. 37 Manufacturers who wish to
obtain maximum sales volume for their products by having them
carried by the greatest number of retailers are reluctant to maintain
prices at a level that would not meet with the approval of their
higher-cost dealers.38 Fair trade laws suppress competition in retail-
ing and the consumer does not therefore get the benefit of savings
brought about by the more efficient retailer. Resale price mainten-
ance compels the low-cost retailer to sell the product at the same
price as the high-cost retailer, the high-turnover retailer to charge
as much as the low-turnover retailer, and the non-service retailer
to sell for the same price as the service retailer.3 9 Surveys allegedly
have shown that there is a definite consumer benefit from loss
leaders.40 Thus, a 1948 study conducted in Maryland and the
District of Columbia showed that of 117 drug items checked, 29
cost one-seventh less, 38 cost a quarter less, and 35 cost a third less
in the non-regulated District of Columbia thari in the fair trade
state of Maryland.41 Similarly, the average cost of 54 drug items
checked in St. Louis, Missouri (a non-regulated state) was 16.2 per
cent less than in East St. Louis, Illinois (a fair trade jurisdiction).41
It is further asserted. by opponents of the legislation that resale
price maintenance is not necessary to keep the small business opera-
ting. Proof of this is supplied by the fact that they are still operating
at a profit in states which do not have fair trade laws.
4
3
NORTH DAKOTA STATUTE COMPARED WITH
NEW TYPE STATUTE
North Dakota enacted in 1937 a fair trade act which was taken
almost verbatim from the 1933 California Act.4" Justice Sutherland's
mitted manufacturer to set minimun resale prices on their trade-marked product. This
conclusion is based on a survey on prices of fifty leading drug store items in 148 drug
stores, 24 per cent of all the drug stores in the two states.").
37. Federal Trade Commission, Report on Resale Price Maintenance, United States
Government Printing Office, 9 (1945).
38. Ibid.
39. See note 35, supra at 421.
40. The Not-So-Fair-Trade Laws, Fortune, Jan. 1949, p. 70.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. See note 35, supra, at 420.
44. Compare N.D. Rev. Code Ch. 51-11 (1943) with Cal. Laws 1933, 793 51 .
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opinion in the Old Dearborn case45 in 1936 gave some new inter-
pretations to the 1933 California statute. These interpretations
influenced the National Association of Retail Druggists in the
drafting of their 1937 Model Fair Trade Statute. 4" This new act was
an improvement over the earlier California act and was readily
adopted by a large number of states.
A comparison of the North Dakota statute with the more recent
Model Act which has been adopted in South Dakota,41 reveals that
both statutes provide (1) that vertical resale price maintenance
agreements are valid," (2) that violations of the act are unfair
competition and actionable at the suit of any person damaged, 49
(3) that non-signer provisions are valid, 50 and (4) that horizontal
resale price contracts or agreements between producers, wholesalers,
or retailers are excluded.5 '
The North Dakota act provides that the protected commodity
must bear the trade-mark, brand or name of the producer or the
owner.5 2 Under the South Dakota act the trade-mark, brand or name
mey be that of the producer or distributor.. 3 South Dakota allows a
distributor who does not own the trade-mark, brand or name to
establish the resale price if he has the permission of the owner.5 4 The
North Dakota act provides that the protected commodity must be in
"fair and open" competition; the South Dakota act uses the term
"free and open" competition as does the Miller-Tydings Amendment
and the McGuire Act. Both terms are equivalent in meaning, that is,
'actual competition." 55
Under the North Dakota act the commodity must be sold at the
price stipulated by the vendor 56 while under the South Dakota act
the only price restriction is that the commodity must not be sold
for less than the stipulated minimum price.5 - The South Dakota Act
is more effective than the North Dakota Act in controlling distribu-
tors when reselling to other middlemen. The South Dakota Act
provides for a contract whereby the seller agrees not to sell to any-
one who will not maintain the stipulated price, or who will not agree
45. See note 3, supra.
46. See note 22, supra, at 903, 904, 905.
47. S.D. Code Ch. 54.04 (1939).
48. N.D. Rev. Code § 51-1102 (1943); S.D. Code § 54.0402 (1939).
49. N.D. Rev. Code § 51-1104 (1943); S.D. Code J 54.0406 (1939).
50. Ibid.
51. N.D. Rev. Code § 51-1105 (1943); S.D. Code § 54.0407 (1939).
52. N.D. Rev. Code § 51-1102 (1943).
53. S.D. Code § 54.0402 (1939).
54. S.D. Code § 54.0404 (1939).
55. Weigel, The Fair Trade Acts, 40 (1938).
56. N.D. Rev. Code § 51-1102 (1) (1943).
57. S.D. Code § 54.0402 (1) (1939).
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to require the persons to whom he sells to maintain the stipulated
price."'
The North Dakota act exempts sales from the resale price main-
tenance contract when the goods are sold in a closing-out sale. 59 The
South Dakota act is similar with the exception that the dealer must
first offer to sell the goods back to the producer or distributor at
the original invoice price, which gives added protection to the
owner's good-will property right.60 South Dakota allows a dealer
to remove or obliterate the trade-mark, brand or name from the
commodity and sell it for less than the fair trade price. However,
he may not refer to the brand in advertising or selling the com-
modity.61 The North Dakota act G2 and South Dakota act 63 alike
exempt sales that are made by any officer acting under the orders
of any court. North Dakota also provides that sales are exempt when
the protected commodity is sold for taxes or other liens.14 This latter
clause seems to add nothing and could be deleted.
The new act differs from the North Dakota statute in that it
prohibits the giving of any article of value such as would be
involved in a two-for-one sale, a one-cent sale, or a free merchan-
dise gift with the purchase of the protected commodity. It would
also prohibit the giving of trading stamps with the purchase of
the protected commodity. Concessions, such as free services that
are normally charged for, may not be given with the purchase of a
protected commodity.63
ENFORCEMENT
The fair trade laws of many states provide only for private en-
forcement of the act.6 6 The North Dakota statuteI provides that
any person damaged6 8 may bring an action for damages against
signers or non-signers who willfully and knowingly offer for sale
or sell below the fair trade price. However, the damaged person
will often have trouble proving damages.69 It may be very difficult
to show the amount of business lost due to price cutting activities.
58. S.D. Code § 54.0402 (2) (1939).
59. N.D. Rev. Code § 51-1103 (1) (1943).
60. S.D. Code 1 54.0405 (1) (1939).
61. S.D. Code § 54.0405 (2) (1939).
62. N.D. Code 5 51-1103 (3) (1943).
63. S.D. Code § 54.0405"(4) (1939).
64. N.D. Rev. Code 51-1103 (4) (1943).
65. See S.D. Code 5 54.0403 (1939).
66. E.g. Ariz. Code Ann. j 74-204 (1939); Iowa Code Ann. § 550.3 (1946).
67. N.D. Rev. Code J 51-1104 (1943).
68. Port Chester Wine & Liguor Shop v. Miller Bros. Fruiterers, 1 N.Y.S. 2d 802.
807 (dictum) ("Statutory aim was threefold: to protect trade maik owners, distributors
and the public.").
69. Weigel, The Fair Trade Acts, 78 (1938).
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The loss of future business may be far greater than the loss which
has already taken place.
Before a producer may bring an action for enforcement of the
act he must have a fair trade price structure which has a real and
not merely a paper or illusory existence.7 0 He must have attempted
a reasonable and diligent enforcement of. the existing fair trade
price.71 The relief which he seeks must be for the sole purpose of
enforcement and not for any ulterior purpose.72 In General Electric
Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co.,73 Justice Greenberg stated that before
a manufacturer asks for future injunctive relief it should (1) keep
itself informed as to price cutting activities and other trends gen-
erally known in the industry or trade. (2) keep close scrutiny over
prior violators and take appropriate action where needed, (3)
investigate and follow up complaints vigorously, and (4) enforce
fair trade prices by repeated legal action if necessary. 74
In contrast to private enforcement in North Dakota, Minnesota
provides for investigation of violations of their fair trade act by
the Commissioner of Business Research and Development.7' The
duties of the Commissioner in regard to the fair trade statute in-
clude assisting the Trade Promotion Division in the enforcement of
the act and suing for injunctive relief on behalf of the state.76 Any
injured person may also bring an action for damages in Minnesota. 77
In Wyoming, the attorney general and the county prosecutors
may bring quo warranto proceedings to forfeit the corporate charter
of a violating domestic corporation and to withdraw the permit to
do business of any foreign corporation violating the act.7 8 Any
injured person may bring an action for damages. 9
The 1955 amendment to the Idaho fair trade act provides
that the governor is responsible for the supervision and administra-
tion of the act. 0 He has authority to designate any department of




73. 199 Misc. 87, 103 N.Y.S. 2d 440 (1951).
74. See note 70, supra at 452
75. Minn. Stat. § 362.14 (1949).
76. 21 U of Ch L. Rev. 205 (1953-54) ("About a hundred complaints were received
by the Division in the nine months period following enactment of the McGuire Act. About
50% of the complaints came from manufacturers, the others originated with retailers. The
Division sends a wire to the offender, stating that a complaint has been received and
citing specific items allegedly sold below the fair trade price. A follow-up letter invites
comments and insists on complicance. No suit for injunctions have been filed since the
accused dealers agreed to discontinue violations.
77. Minn. Stat. 5 325.12 (1949).
78. Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 39-308 1945).
79. Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1 39-306 (1945).
80. Idaho Code § 48-310 (Supp. 1955).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
the state government as the agency to inspect and investigate sales
practices of all persons subject to the act; to ascertain violation, to
prosecute all such violations by either injunction proceedings,
criminal proceedings, or both; and to aid and assist the attorney-
general and the county prosecuting attorney in the investigation of
violations.8l A violation of the act is a misdemeanor and is punish-
able by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or by imprison-
ment of not longer than six months or by both.12 In a civil suit the
plaintiff is entitled to recover from the violator three times the
amount of the actual damages. However, it is not necessary for the
plaintiff to prove damages to obtain an injunction if he can show
a violation of the act.
8 3
As stated above, North Dakota leaves the enforcement of the
act up to the "damaged person." A search has failed to uncover a
North Dakota case involving a violation of the fair trade law of this
state. This could mean that there has been no violation of the act
to date; or that as yet no "damaged person" has felt that he can
afford to devote the time and money to such litigation.
CONCLUSION
The advantages and disadvantages of the fair trade law have
been the subject of much controversy. The decision to have a fair
trade statute in North Dakota has been indicated by the enactment
of our present law. If we are to have a fair trade law, it should be
effective.
Defects in the present North Dakota fair trade law have been
pointed out. The new type act, such as the present South Dakota
statute, would remedy some of these defects. In addition to possible
adoption of the new type fair trade act, adequate enforcement
methods should be provided. The enforcement provisions of the
fair trade laws, new or old type, are of little value as they now
stand. Features of the Minnesota and Idaho acts should be studied
for possible adoption. State supervision as provided for by the
above two acts would bring to light present violations and would
aid in deterring future violations of the act. The state should have
the authority to both investigate and prosecute violations of the
act. In addition to the granting of injunctions the statute should
provide for punishment by fine or jail sentence or both. Treble
damages would encourage the injured person to assert his rights.
81. Ibid.
82. Idaho Code § 48-309 (Supp. 1955).
83. Idaho Code § 48-308 (Supp. 1955).
NOTES
An injunction should be granted upon proof of a violation and the
plaintiff should not be required to prove damages.
LYLE E. BALL
INSURANCE-MOTOR VEHICLES-SCOPE OF THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE-
The typical omnibus clause found in the modern automobile li-
ability policy reads as follows:
"With respect to the insurance for bodily injury and for
property damage liability, the unqualified word 'insured'
includes the named insured and, if the named insured is an
individual, his spouse if a resident of the same household, and
also includes any person while using the automobile and any
person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof,
provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named
insured or such spouse or with the permission of either. .. "
The omnibus clause is of comparatively recent origin, one
authority having cited it as a creature of the late nineteen
twenties.2 Its existence has resulted from the twin factors of
legislation and the fact its inclusion in the policy is regarded by
the insurance industry as a "sales point."
Legislative action has developed the clause in two ways.
Some states have enacted statutes which specifically require in-
.surance policies to contain such clauses.3 Other states have achieved
the same result by the adoption of statutes imputing liability to
-the owner of the car for the negligence of the driver who had per-
mission to drive it.4 It has been held that where such a clause is
:required by statute, the policy will be treated as containing the
required provision wheither it is actually present or not.5
The moving spirit behind the adoption of laws requiring in-
,clusion of an omnibus clause is the desire to promote the in-
terests of the public as well as the additional insureds.6 Apparently
this consideration of public policy has been the determining basis
for construing the application of the clause in some jurisdictions.,
Although courts have held that the omnibus clause is not am-
.1. Taken from a speciment policy issued by the Association of Casualty and Surety
'Companies, 60 John Street, New York, New York (1954).
2. Appleman, Special Phases of the "Omnibus Clause" in Insurance Policies, 22 A.B.A.J.
W13 (1936).
3. Ohio Rev. Code J 4509.01 (Baldwin 1953); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 75, § 1253 (Pardon
1953).
4. Cal. Code Vehicle Ann. § 402 (Deering 1948); Mich. Comp. Laws § 256.29 (1948).
5. Maxey v. American Cas. Co., 180 Va. 285, 23 S.E.2d 221 (1942);
Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. ToUefsen, 219 Wis. 434, 263 N.W. 376 (1935).
6. Locke v. General Accident, Fire, and Life Assurance Corp., 227 Wis. 489, 279 N.W.
.55, 58 (1938) (dictum).
7. Chatfield v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 208 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1953).
